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Abstract. Given a data-set of consumer behaviour, the Revealed Pref-
erence Graph succinctly encodes inferred relative preferences between
observed outcomes as a directed graph. Not all graphs can be constructed
as revealed preference graphs when the market dimension is fixed. This
paper solves the open problem of determining exactly which graphs are
attainable as revealed preference graphs in d-dimensional markets. This
is achieved via an exact characterization which closely ties the feasibility
of the graph to the Matrix Sign Rank of its signed adjacency matrix.
The paper also shows that when the preference relations form a partially
ordered set with order-dimension k, the graph is attainable as a revealed
preference graph in a k-dimensional market.
Keywords: Revealed Preference · Matrix Sign Rank · Partial Order.
1 Introduction
In standard economic analysis and mechanism design, it is often assumed that
the agents’ valuation functions are known a priori, or more commonly, a proba-
bility distribution over possible agent types is assumed to be known. However, in
practice, we may only observe the prices which are set, and the subsequent be-
haviour of the agents. Assuming the agents act rationally, and that their utility
functions are restricted to some well-defined class, information about the rela-
tive values attributed to various outcomes may be inferred by simply observing
the agents’ behaviour at various prices. This idea was first pioneered by Paul
Samuelson in 1938 [24], and a large body of work has followed. See [25] for a
thorough survey on the subject. The concept came to be known as revealed pref-
erence: when an agent chooses different outcomes given different prices, she is
(under some assumptions) revealing that one is preferable to the other.
Though this may seem natural at first, the implementation of these ideas has
required much mathematical development for the description, characterization,
and computation of the revealed preferences. In the model originally studied
by Samuelson, the agent is assumed to have an underlying valuation function
and a fixed budget. She seeks to choose the collection of goods which has the
largest value while satisfying her budget constraint at the current prices. This
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is the most common formulation, though others exist (see e.g. [12]). This paper,
however, deals only with the standard model.
The market consists of d distinct, separable goods, and a collection of goods
(or bundle) is denoted as a vector x ∈ Rd≥0, where the i-th coordinate of x rep-
resents the quantity of the i-th good. The prices are linear, and are described by
a vector p ∈ Rd≥0 such that the price of a bundle x is given by the inner product
〈p,x〉. In this model, a bundle x is revealed preferred to a bundle y if at current
prices p, the agent chose x, but y was more affordable, i.e. 〈p,x〉 ≥ 〈p,y〉. Since
the agent is assumed to be maximizing value within a budget constraint, y must
be less valuable than x.
Samuelson originally asked whether revealed preferences may be used to ver-
ify whether an agent’s behaviour is consistent with the model assumptions: if
an agent’s behaviour is contradictory, then one must conclude that the model
assumption is incorrect. He first conjectured a simple test, which was confirmed
to be correct in special cases by Rose [22], but disproved in the general case.
Houthakker [20] proposed a stronger test of “cyclical consistency” and proved
its correctness non-constructively in our setting. The most famous result is given
by Afriat [1], where he shows a slightly more general result, and gives explicit
constructions of the valuation function as a certificate for consistency. The notion
of cyclical consistency has since been called the “Strong/Generalized Axiom of
Revealed Preference” (SARP/GARP), and is used to this day in many empirical
settings [17,26,27], including as bidding rules in combinatorial auction mecha-
nisms, to deter non-truthful bidding practices [4,18,13,3]. We will not delve into
the details of the axioms of revealed preference, but a thorough survey may be
found at [25]. It is however helpful to be familiar with the concept of a revealed
preference graph, which is defined below. A more familiar treatment to economic
audiences is given in [10].
Revealed Preference Graphs: Recall that in Samuelson’s model, an agent
may choose goods from the consumption space Rd≥0, and seeks to choose the
bundle x∗ which maximizes her valuation v(x) subject to the budget constraint
〈p,x〉 ≤ 1, up to re-scaling. Suppose now that we make n observations of this
agent at different price points p1, p2, . . . , pn ∈ R
d
≥0, and that at prices pi, her
optimal bundle was xi. If her behaviour is rational, then whenever 〈pi,xi〉 ≥
〈pi,xj〉, she must value xi greater than xj since the latter was affordable when
the former was chosen. Thus, she has revealed that xi is preferable to xj .
These preference relations may be modelled as a directed graph: let G be a
graph on vertex set {1, . . . , n}, and add an edge directed from i to j if xi is
revealed preferred to xj . Thus, (i, j) ∈ G if and only if 〈pi,xi〉 ≥ 〈pi,xj〉. This
graph is implicit in the proofs of Afriat, and the notion of cyclical consistency
is equivalent to requiring that G not contain any directed cycles. In general, a
preference graph inferred from observations need not be acyclic.
Most uses of revealed preference as bidding rules in combinatorial auctions
(cited above) rely on testing properties of this revealed preference graph. In
past work [7,8], we have asked whether such tests, e.g. the minimum feedback
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vertex set, are efficiently computable. We concluded that for this one test, its
computational complexity is in fact dependent on the market dimension d: when
the dimension of the pi and xj vectors is fixed, but the number of observations
is unbounded, then the class of observable graphs is restricted, and the com-
putational complexity of some problems may depend on the parameter d. For
example, it was shown by Deb and Pai [14] that when d = n, every directed
graph on n vertices is observable over Rn, but that for all fixed d, there exist
exponentially large graphs which can not be observed in d dimensions.
This past work has led us to asking whether one could characterize the class
of preference graphs observable in the market Rd for some fixed d. In fact, this
question had been posed as an open problem by Federico Echenique [10].
Question: For a fixed dimension d, which directed graphs may be observed as
revealed-preference graphs on bundles in Rd?
This paper answers this question by giving an exact characterization of all
graphs observable over Rd, given in terms of the matrix sign rank of signed adja-
cency matrices. The notion of matrix sign rank deals with the existence of low-
rank matrices whose entries satisfy certain sign constraints; see [6] for an intro-
duction. More formally, the matrix sign rank of a sign matrix S ∈ {0,+,−}n×m
is defined as the least rank real-valued matrix M ∈ Rn×m whose entries have
the same signs as the entries in S. Matrix sign rank has been influential in many
fields, including complexity theory and learning theory. Seminal lower bounds in
communication complexity [16] and circuit complexity [21] rely on using the ma-
trix sign rank of a problem to measure its hardness, whereas linear classification
algorithms benefit from low-dimensional embeddings of classification problems,
as given by sign-rank [2,23,9].
Summary of the results. To answer the above question, we introduce the
notion of RP dimension, defined as follows: Given a directed graph G, what is
the least d such that G may be observed as a preference graph over Rd?
In this paper, we give an exact characterization of the set of graphs with
RP dimension d, for all d ≥ 1. We show that, for a given graph, it can be
realized as preference observations over Rd if and only if its signed adjacency
matrix has sign-rank at most d + 1. Thus, the RP dimension of the graph G
is exactly the sign-rank of its signed adjacency matrix, minus one. In fact, this
paper shows that determining the RP dimension of directed graphs is equivalent
to determining the sign rank of a large class of sign matrices, a problem which
is known to be NP-hard [6].
This paper also considers the special case of directed graphs which represent
partially ordered sets, or posets. We show that the RP dimension is at most
the order-dimension of the poset, and that this bound is tight when the order-
dimension is at most 3. However, there exist posets of arbitrarily large order-
dimension, which can be realized in R3.
Acknowledgements. I would like to thank Ruta Mehta, Adrian Vetta, and
Siddharth Barman, for their insightful discussion in the initial stages of work.
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2 Model, Preliminaries, and Summary of Results
This section formally lays out the concepts introduced above. As discussed in
the introduction, it is assumed that an agent is observed repeatedly in a market.
Faced with price-vector p ∈ Rd≥0, she chooses the item which maximizes her
valuation subject to a budget constraint. Thus, she chooses x∗ as the bundle
which maximizes v(x) subject to 〈p,x〉 ≤ 1. Assume that on the i-th obser-
vation, the agent was faced with prices pi, and chose the bundle xi. Then we
have that xi is revealed preferred to xj if 〈pi,xi〉 ≥ 〈pi,xj〉, since xj must
have been affordable when xi was chosen. Given a collection of observations
(p1,x1), (p2,x2), . . . , (pn,xn), we may construct a directed preference graph G
on vertex set {1, . . . , n} with an edge from i to j if xi is revealed preferred to xj .
This paper, however, does not deal with constructing preference graphs from
data sets, but rather of constructing data sets from preference graphs. Thus, we
introduce the notion of the realization of a preference graph:
Definition 1 (RP realization). Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph with
vertices labelled {1, . . . , n}, and let X := {(p1,x1), . . . , (pn,xn)} be pairs of
vertices in Rd such that pi ≥ 0 for all i ≤ n. Then X is said to RP-realize
G if for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the directed edge (i, j) is present in G if and only if
〈pi,xi〉 > 〈pi,xj〉.
Note that we require strict inequality to induce preference. This is purely
for mathematical convenience, and is not standard in the definitions of revealed
preference. Since we are only considering the existence of the realization, rather
than the realization itself, this is assumed without loss of generality. We also
define a notion of weak RP realization, which we will show is equivalent.
Definition 2 (Weak RP realization). As above, let G = (V,E) be a directed
graph with vertices labelled {1, . . . , n}, and let X := {(p1,x1), . . . , (pn,xn)} be
pairs of vertices in Rd such that 〈pi,1〉 > 0 for all i ≤ n, where 1 = (1, 1, 1, . . . ).
Then X is said to weakly RP-realize G if for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, the directed edge
(i, j) is present in G if and only if 〈pi,xi〉 > 〈pi,xj〉.
The difference between RP realization and weak RP realization is the restric-
tion on the possible p vectors. We will show below that these two notions of RP
realization are equivalent in the following sense: given a graph G and an integer
d, there exists an RP realization of G in Rd if and only if there exists a weak
RP realization in Rd.
It is natural to ask whether an RP realization is possible, and whether this
depends on the value of d. In fact, it was shown by Dep and Pai [14] that when
d = n, a realization is always possible. (Simply set xi to be the i-th standard
basis vector, and set (pi)j = 0 if (i, j) ∈ G, 1 if i = j, and 2 if (i, j) /∈ G.) We
wish to determine the minimum value of d for which this is possible. Thus, we
introduce the notion of RP dimension.
Definition 3 (RP dimension). Let G = (V,E) be a directed graph on n
vertices. Then the RP dimension of G, (denoted RPDim(G)) is the minimum d
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such that there exists an RP realization of G in Rd. We denote as RevPrefDim
the computational problem of computing RPDim(G) for a given di-graph G.
As mentioned above, we will show taht the RP dimension does not change
if the RP realization is allowed to be weak. We will be characterizing the RP
dimension of candidate preference graphs by the sign-rank of an associated sign
matrix. We define below the notion of realization for sign matrices, and define
sign rank as the minimum rank of a realization:
Definition 4 (Matrix sign realization). Let M ∈ {+,−, 0}n×m be an n×m
matrix whose entries are given by the symbols +, −, and 0. Let A ∈ Rn×m be
an n×m real-valued matrix. Then A is a matrix sign realization of M if Aij > 0
whenever Mij = +, Aij < 0 whenever Mij = −, and Aij = 0 whenever Mij = 0.
Definition 5 (Matrix sign-rank). Let M ∈ {+,−, 0}n×m, then the sign-
rank of M , (denoted SgnRnk(M)) is the minimum r such that there exists a
matrix sign realization A of M with rank r. We denote as MatSgnRnk the
computational problem of finding SgnRnk(M) for a given matrix M .
Finally we will show that when the preference graph is induced by a partially
ordered set or poset, the RP dimension of the graph is related to properties of
the poset. Partially ordered sets have been the subject of much study, and many
textbooks on the matter make for a good introduction (see e.g. [19]). Below is a
formal definition, included for completeness.
Definition 6 (Partially-ordered set (Poset)). Let S be some (finite) ground
set, and let ≻ be a transitive, acyclic, and irreflexive, binary relation on S. That
is, for all a, b, c ∈ S, a ⊁ a, and if a ≻ b and b ≻ c, then a ≻ c.1 Then the pair
(S,≻) is termed a partially-ordered set, or poset. The poset may also be seen as a
directed graph G = (S,≻), which must be acyclic and transitively closed. A total
order is a poset whose underlying undirected graph is complete. Alternatively, a
total order is the poset induced by a ranking of the elements of S.
Every partial order is the intersection of some total orders. The order dimen-
sion of a poset captures the least number of total orders needed to realize it.
Definition 7 (Order dimension). Let (S,≻) be a poset, andO = {≻1, . . . , ≻k}
be k distinct total orders on S. Then O realizes the poset (S,≻) if for all a, b ∈ S,
a ≻ b if and only if a ≻i b for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The order dimension of (S,≻) is the
minimum k such that there exists a collection of k total orders which realize ≻.
2.1 Results
We formally state here the results of this paper and outlines of their proofs. The
proofs in full technical detail will be presented in the next sections. The main
1 These two conditions imply that the relation must be acyclic.
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goal is to show that for each directed graph G, there exists an associated sign
matrix M such that RPDim(G) = SgnRnk(M)− 1.
For simplicity of notation, though, we extend all directed graphs with a fully-
dominated and fully-dominating node as follows: given a directed graph G, let
G+ be the graph obtained by adding two nodes s and t to G, and for all v ∈ G,
adding an edge (s, v) and an edge (v, t) to G, plus the edge (s, t).
Finally, for a directed graph G, we define its signed adjacency matrix M(G)
as follows: M(G)ij is 0 if i = j, +1 if (i, j) ∈ G, and −1 otherwise. This allows
us to formally state the first, and most important result:
Theorem 1. For all G, RPDim(G) = RPDim(G+) = SgnRnk(M(G+))− 1.
To show this, we first constructively show that any RP realization in d di-
mensions implies a sign-rank realization with rank d + 1. Next, we argue that
a sign-rank realization of M(G+) with rank r implies a weak RP realization in
r − 1 dimensions. Using the following lemma, we conclude the theorem:
Lemma 1. A graph G admits an RP realization with vectors in Rd if and only
if it admits a weak RP realization with vectors in Rd.
As a special case, we consider the case of partially ordered sets.
We begin by showing first that the order-dimension of the poset is an upper-
bound on the RP dimension.
Theorem 2. Let (S,≻) be a poset with order-dimension k, a and let G = (S,≻)
be the associated directed graph. Then RPDim(G) ≤ k.
This is shown by first introducing the “dominance ordering” interpretation
of order dimension, and then embedding the elements of the partial order in such
a way as to achieve such an ordering. A dominance ordering is simply a partial
order on points in Rk, where x ≻ y if and only if xi ≥ yi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. This
naturally has order dimension at most k, since it suffices to sort the points by
their positing in each of the k dimensions.
Unfortunately, the converse does not hold. We show first that for k sufficiently
small, order dimension and RP dimension are equal, but bad examples exist for
large order dimension.
Theorem 3. Let (S,≻) be a poset with order-dimension k, a and let G = (S,≻)
be the associated directed graph. Then RPDim(G) ≥ min{k, 3}. Furthermore, for
all k ≥ 3, there exist posets G = (S,≻) of order-dimension k, but RPDim(G) = 3.
3 RP Dimension and Sign Rank – Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we prove Theorem 1, as was outlined in Section 2.1. We begin
by showing the equivalence of RP realization and weak RP realization, given by
definitions 1 and 2, respectively. Thus, we wish to prove Lemma 1. The proof
of this lemma effectively reduces to transforming a cone into the cone spanned
by the standard basis vectors, though we have included a careful analysis, which
allows us to greatly reduce the technical burden of proving Theorem 1.
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Lemma 1. A graph G admits an RP realization with vectors in Rd if and only
if it admits a weak RP realization with vectors in Rd.
Proof. An RP realization is by definition a weak RP realization, so one direction
of the implication follows trivially. It suffices to show that the existence of a
weak RP realization implies the existence of an RP realization, which we will do
constructively. Let X := {(p1,x1), . . . , (pn,xn)} be the d-dimensional vectors
which weakly realizeG. In other words, (i, j) ∈ G if and only if 〈pi,xi〉 > 〈pi,xj〉.
Let b1, b2, . . . , bd−1 be a basis for the space orthogonal to the all-ones vector 1.
Thus, 〈1, bi〉 = 0 for all i, and B = {1, b1, b2, . . . , bd−1} is a basis for R
d.
We wish to express the p vectors as positive combinations of the b vectors,
and thus restrict them to lie in a cone. This will allow us to map the rays of the
cone to the standard basis vectors, and get the desired “strong” RP realization.
Since B is a basis, we can express pi =
∑d−1
j=0 α
i
jbj for all i and j, where b0 = 1.
We have chosen the bi’s as orthogonal to 1, and by assumption 〈1,pi〉 > 0
for all i. Hence, αi0 > 0 for all i, and we define ǫ = min{α
1
0, . . . , α
n
0 } > 0.
However, for all j 6= 0, we may have αij negative. To this end, define λj =
min{−1, α1j , α
2
j , . . . , α
n
j } for all 1 ≤ j ≤ d − 1. Hence, α
i
j − λj ≥ 0 for all i
and j. We now define a slightly modified basis B̂ = {b1, . . . , bd−1, b̂d}, where
b̂d = ǫ1+
∑d−1
j=1 λjbj . In this new basis, we can express
pi =
αi0
ǫ
· b̂d +
d−1∑
j=1
bj ·
(
αij −
αi0λj
ǫ
)
(1)
Recall that λj < 0 and α
i
0 ≥ ǫ, so
αi0λj
ǫ
≤ λj , and thus α
i
j −
αi0λj
ǫ
≥ αij −λj > 0,
by construction. Thus, not only is B̂ a basis for Rd, but the pi vectors are non-
negative combinations of the basis vectors.
It remains, then to construct a linear map which goes between the standard
basis and the basis B̂. Let B be the matrix whose columns are the vectors of B̂,
and note that for the j-th standard basis vector ej, we have Bej = bj , for all
1 ≤ j ≤ d, setting bd := b̂d. Therefore, B
−1bj = ej for all 1 ≤ j ≤ d. Since we
have shown that the p vectors are non-negative combinations of the B̂ vectors,
we may conclude that for all i, B−1pi has all non-negative entries. Furthermore,〈
B−1pi, B
Txj
〉
= (B−1pi)
TBTxj = p
T
i (B
−1)TBTxj = 〈pi,xj〉 (2)
Therefore, setting p̂i = B
−1pi, and x̂j = B
Txj , we have that 〈p̂i, x̂j〉 > 0 if and
only if 〈pi,xj〉 > 0, so X̂ := {(p̂1, x̂1), . . . , (p̂n, x̂n)} are d-dimensional vectors
which strongly realize G, as desired. ⊓⊔
To complete the proof of the theorem, it remains to construct low-rank sign
matrices for preference graphs which have low-dimensional RP realizations, and
construct low-dimensional weak RP realizations when the augmented directed
graph has a sign-incidence matrix with low sign rank. We begin by recalling
the definition of the augmented preference graph: For any directed graph G, let
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G+ be constructed by appending two nodes s and t to G, adding the directed
edge (s, t), and for all v ∈ G, adding the directed edges (s, v) and (v, t). We
begin by observing that the addition of these two extra nodes does not affect
the RP dimension of the graph:
Claim. RPDim(G) = RPDim(G+).
Proof. Let d := RPDim(G) and d′ := RPDim(G+). Clearly, RPDim(G) ≤ d′,
since it suffices to remove the vectors representing the s and t nodes from any
realization of G+ in d′ dimensions. It remains to show RPDim(G+) ≤ d. We
say a vector x = (x1, . . . , xd) dominates y = (y1, . . . , yd) if xi ≥ yi for all
1 ≤ i ≤ d. Now, let X := {(p1,x1), . . . , (pn,xn)} be the d-dimensional vectors
which realize G. Assume that the realization is a standard realization, as in
definition 1, as opposed to a weak one. Then we must have that if xi dominates
xj , there is an (i, j) edge in G.
Now, the collection x1, . . . ,xn is finite, and so there must exist vectors xs
and xt such that xs dominates xi and xi dominates xt for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It
suffices to set ps = pt = 1, and this gives a d-dimensional realization of G
+, as
desired. ⊓⊔
Now that we have shown that G and G+ have the same sign-rank, we may
introduce the signed adjacency matrix. For any graph G on the vertex set
{1, . . . , s}, let M(G) be defined as
M(G)ij =


0 if i = j
+ if (i, j) ∈ G
− if (i, j) /∈ G
(3)
In what follows, we show that if RPDim(G+) = d, then SgnRnk(M(G+)) ≤ d+ 1,
and if SgnRnk(M(G+)) = r, then there is a weak RP realization for G+ in r− 1
dimensions. Both of those directions will be shown constructively, following a
similar construction. We begin by showing the first direction:
Lemma 2. SgnRnk(M(G+)) ≤ RPDim(G+) + 1.
Proof. Let X := {(p1,x1), . . . , (pn,xn)} be the d-dimensional vectors which
realize G+, that is for all i, j ∈ V (G), (i, j) ∈ E(G) if and only if 〈pi,xi〉 >
〈pi,xj〉. We construct the following matrix: let A(X ) be the n× n-dimensional
matrix whose entries are given by A(X )ij = 〈pi,xi − xj〉 for all i, j ≤ n. Observe
that we have chosen the entries of M(G) to be exactly the signs of the entries
of A(X ). Thus, it suffices to show that A(X ) has rank at most d+ 1, which will
imply that M(G) has sign-rank at most d+ 1. Indeed,
A(X ) =


← p1 → 〈p1,x1〉
← p2 → 〈p2,x2〉
...
...
← pn → 〈pn,xn〉


︸ ︷︷ ︸
n×(d+1)
·


↑ ↑ ↑
−x1 −x2 · · · −xn
↓ ↓ ↓
1 1 · · · 1


︸ ︷︷ ︸
(d+1)×n
(4)
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Since the inner-dimension of the product is d + 1, this implies that A(X ) has
rank at most d+ 1, as desired. ⊓⊔
We will use this same construction to show the converse. The extension G+
is required to ensure that this is possible, and that the vectors do indeed form a
weak RP realization.
Lemma 3. RPDim(G+) ≤ SgnRnk(M(G+))− 1.
Proof. Let A be some rank-r realization of M(G+). Assume without loss of
generality that the first and second rows and columns of M(G+) are associated
to the dominating and dominated vertices, respectively. Thus, M(G+) has the
form 

0 + + + + · · ·
− 0 − − − · · ·
− + 0 ∗ ∗ · · ·
− + ∗ 0 ∗ · · ·
...
...
...
...
. . .
. . .


Thus, letting Ai be the i-th row of A, we have that A1 − A2 is an all-positive
vector. Since A has rank r, we may set a1 = A1 − A2, and extend it to a basis
A = {a1,a2, . . . ,ar} for the rows of A. Let R be the r × n matrix whose rows
are the vectors of A, and let L be the matrix of coefficients such that A = LR.
Note that scaling the columns of A is the same as scaling the columns of R,
and this scaling process does not affect the rank of the matrix. Furthermore, if
the scaling factors are positive, then the sign pattern is unaffected. Thus, we
may assume without loss of generality that a1 = 1, by rescaling column j by
1/(a1[j]) > 0, for all j. (We are using square brackets to denote the entries of
the vector.) Thus, we may interpret the entries of L and R as in equation (4).
Now, if the i-th row of L is given by the vector ℓi, we set pi := ℓi[1..r − 1], and
assume 〈pi,xi〉 = ℓi[r]. Furthermore, if the j-th column of R is given by (rj , 1),
then we set xj = −rj . Since the diagonal entries of M(G
+) are zero, we must
have that 1 · 〈pi,xi〉+ 〈pi,−xi〉 = 0, which is consistent.
Thus, we have vectors pi and xj in R
r−1 such that 〈pi,xi〉 > 〈pi,xj〉 if and
only if (i, j) ∈ G+. It suffices to transform these vectors to ensure 〈1,pi〉 > 0
for all i. Recall that we have assumed that G+ contains the edges (1, i) and
(i, 2) for all 3 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, we must have 〈pi,xi〉 ≤ 〈pi,x1〉 and 〈pi,xi〉 >
〈pi,x2〉. Therefore, 〈pi,x1 − x2〉 > 0 for all i ≥ 3. Similarly to the proof of
Lemma 1, we will use this to find an appropriate linear transformation for the
p and x vectors. Let Q be any invertible matrix such that Q(x1 − x2) = 1.
Then, setting p̂i := (Q
−1)Tpi, and x̂j := Qxj, we have 〈pi,xj〉 = 〈p̂i, x̂j〉, and
0 < 〈p̂i, x̂1 − x̂2〉 = 〈p̂i,1〉. Thus, we have constructed a weak RP realization
for G+ in r − 1 dimensions. ⊓⊔
We claim that this completes the proof of Theorem 1: Lemma 1 ensures that
a weak realization is possible if and only if a “strong” one is, the above Claim
ensures that RPDim(G+) = RPDim(G), these two facts along with Lemma 2
imply that RPDim(G) ≤ SgnRnk(M(G+))−1, and finally, Lemma 3 implies that
RPDim(G) ≥ SgnRnk(M(G+))− 1, from which we conclude Theorem 1.
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4 RP Dimension and Order Dimension – Proofs of
Theorems 2 and 3
In this section, we prove Theorems 2 and 3, as was outlined in Section 2.1.
We begin by defining the notion of a dominance order, and noting the natural
interpretation of dimension as order dimension. Recall from section 3 the notion
of vector dominance: where we say x dominates y if it is at least as great in
each coordinate. This is denoted x ≥ y. A standard form of geometrically-
defined partial orders is a vector-dominance partial order: Given a set of vectors
x1, . . . , xn, we set i ≻ j if and only if xi ≥ xj . It is easy to check that this
relation is transitive and acyclic. We remark that the vector-dominance poset
induced by points in Rd has order dimension at most d: For all 1 ≤ j ≤ d, set
the j-th total order to be the ordering of the n points with respect to their j-th
coordinate. Then i ≻ j if and only if all d total orders agree on the relative
ordering of xi and xj . The converse also holds: if a partial order has order-
dimension k, then it can be expressed as a vector-dominance poset in Rk. We
will formalize this fact and extend it to show Theorem 2.
Proof (of Theorem 2). Let (S,≻) be a poset with order-dimension k, a and let
G = (S,≻) be the associated directed graph. We wish to show RPDim(G) ≤ k.
Let ≻1, . . . , ≻k be the k total orders which realize ≻. Note that each total
order ≻i induces a ranking σi on the elements of S, such that a ≻i b if and only
if σi(a) > σi(b). Assume without loss of generality that σi maps the elements
of S to {1, . . . , |S|}. Then the usual dominance embedding of (S,≻) is given by
mapping each a ∈ S to φ(a) := σ(a) := (σ1(a), σ2(a), . . . , σk(a)). Now, a ≻ b if
and only if φ(a) dominates φ(b).
For the purposes of RP-dimension, we need a rescaled embedding. If k = 1,
then (S,≻) is a total order, and setting xi = σ(i), pi = 1 will suffice. Other-
wise, define ψ(a) := (kσ1(a), kσ2(a), . . . , kσk(a)). Since k ≥ 2, this maintains the
dominance ordering of φ. Now, if we set xi = ψ(i), and
pi =
(
1
kσ1(i)
, 1
kσ2(i)
, . . . , 1
kσk(i)
)
then we get 〈pi,xi〉 = k. Furthermore, letting y
i
j = (. . . , 0, k
σj(i)+1, 0, . . . ), we
have
〈
pi,y
i
j
〉
= k for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Therefore, the hyperplane normal to pi,
passing through xi, will also pass through y
i
j for all j. Since the σ values are
presumed to be positive integers, this means that xi = ψ(i) can only be revealed-
preferred to xj = ψ(j) if xi dominates xj .
Thus, we have constructed a set of vectors in Rk which realizes G = (S,≻),
which allows us to conclude that RPDim(G) ≤ k. ⊓⊔
It remains to prove Theorem 3, that is that for k = 1, 2, or 3, posets of order
dimension k have RP dimension k, but that for all k ≥ 3, there exists a poset of
order dimension k but order dimension 3. We begin by showing this first part:
Lemma 4. A poset has RP dimension 1 or 2 if and only if it has order dimen-
sion 1 or 2, respectively.
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Proof. Note that an RP realization in R1 is simply a total order on the players,
since we have (i, j) ∈ G if and only if pixi > pixj . Since we need pi > 0, we have
(i, j) ∈ G if and only if xi > xj , and therefore, the values of x1, . . . , xn induce
a total order on the elements. Thus, any graph has RP dimension 1 if and only
if it is a poset of order dimension 1, namely, a total order.
Thus, we conclude that a poset of order dimension 2 must have RP dimension
equal to 2. It remains to show that a poset with RP dimension 2 must have order
dimension 2. It is known that a poset has order dimension 2 if and only if the
complement of its comparability graph is also a comparability graph [5]. In our
terms, a poset (S,≻) has order dimension 2 if and only if (a) at least one pair of
elements is not comparable, i.e. there is some x, y ∈ S such that neither x ≻ y
nor y ≻ x, and (b) there exists a partial order ≻′ on S whose comparable pairs
are exactly those which are non-comparable in (S,≻). Thus, for any two x, y ∈ S,
we must have exactly one of x ≺ y, x ≻ y, x ≺′ y, and x ≻′ y hold. Therefore,
to show that a partial order with RP dimension 2 must have order dimension 2,
we must construct a partial order on its non-comparable pairs.
Let X := {(p1,x1), . . . , (pn,xn)} be the 2-dimensional vectors which re-
alize (S,≻), that is for all i, j ∈ S, i ≻ j if and only if 〈pi,xi〉 > 〈pi,xj〉.
Furthermore, denote xi = (xi, yi) and pi = (pi, qi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Recall also
that we have assumed pij ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and j = 1, 2. For every pair i, j
such that neither i ≻ j nor j ≻ i, we say i ≻′ j if xi > xj , and j ≻
′ i otherwise.
This is clearly acyclic, it remains to show that the relation is transitive.
Let x1,p1,x2,p2,x3,p3 be such that 〈pi,xj〉 ≥ 〈pi,xi〉 for all j 6= i, and
x1 > x2 > x3. This implies that 1 ≻
′ 2 ≻′ 3. We wish to show that 1 ≻′ 3. It
is clear that x1 > x3, so it remains to show that both 〈p1,x3〉 ≥ 〈p1,x1〉, and
〈p3,x1〉 ≥ 〈p3,x3〉. We may assume without loss of generality that pi > 0 for
i = 1, 2, 3, since we may slightly rotate the space, and so we may assume without
loss of generality that pi = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3, since scaling p does not affect the
induced preferences. Thus, 〈pi,xj〉 = xj + qiyj for all i, j. Now, x1 > x2, but
x2 + q1y2 > x1 + q1y1, so we must have y1 < y2. Similarly, we get y2 < y3.
Furthermore, we have
x1 + q2y1 > x2 + q2y2
− x1 + q1y1 < x2 + q1y2
⇒ (q2 − q1)y1 > (q2 − q1)y2
(5)
but y1 < y2, so we conclude q2 < q1. Similarly, we have q3 < q2. Now, since
q1 > q2 but y2 < y3, we have that
x3 + q2y3 ≥ x2 + q2y2 =⇒ x3 + q1y3 ≥ x2 + q1y2 (6)
But we know that x2 + q1y2 ≥ x1 + q1y1, so we have that 〈p1,x3〉 ≥ 〈p1,x1〉.
The converse inequality is shown similarly, and thus we may conclude that the
relation ≻′ is a partial order.
Since any two elements are comparable in ≻ if and only if they are not
comparable in ≻′, we conclude that the order dimension of ≻ is at most 2. Since
its RP dimension is not 1, it must have order dimension exactly 2, as desired. ⊓⊔
12 Shant Boodaghians
With this lemma in hand, we conclude that if a poset has order dimension
3, it must have RP dimension 3, as its RP dimension is at most 3, but it cannot
have dimension 1 or 2. Thus, we have proved the first half of Theorem 3. It
remains to show that for all k ≥ 3, there exist posets with order dimension k,
but RP dimension 3.
The family of standard posets S2, S3, . . . is a sequence of posets such that
Sk has order dimension k, and ground set of size 2k. (See e.g. [15]) They are
defined as follows: The ground set for Sk is labelled 1, 2, . . . , k, 1
′, 2′, . . . , k′,
and we have i′ ≻ j for all i 6= j. No pair i′, j′ or i, j is comparable.
We will show that Gk = (Sk,≻k) has RP dimension 3 for all k ≥ 3. Let H :=
{x ∈ R3 : 〈1,x〉 = 0}, the plane normal to the all-ones vector in R3, and let SH
be the unit circle in H centered at the origin. Thus, SH = {x ∈ H : ‖x‖2 = 1}.
Finally, let a1, . . . , an be n equally spaced points along the circumference of SH .
We will use these to construct our realization of (Sk,≻k) in R
3. For all i ≤ k, set
xi = (2+ǫ)ai, and xi′ = 1−ai, where ǫ > 0 will be chosen later. Set pi = 1−ai,
and pi′ = 1 + ai. Since the ai’s are unit vectors, we have that 〈ai,aj〉 < 1 if
i 6= j, and = 1 if i = j.
We have 〈pi,xj〉 = (2+ǫ) 〈1,aj〉−(2+ǫ) 〈ai,aj〉. The left hand term is 0, and
the right hand term is minimized when i = j. Thus, xi is not revealed preferred
to xj for all j 6= i. Furthermore, 〈pi,xj′〉 = 〈1− ai,1− aj〉 = 〈1,1〉+ 〈ai,aj〉,
since 〈1,aj〉 = 0 for all j. Thus, xi is not revealed preferred to xj′ for all j.
Now, 〈pi′ ,xi′〉 = 〈1+ ai,1− ai〉 = 〈1,1〉 − 〈ai,ai〉 = 2, whereas 〈pi′ ,xj〉 =
(2+ǫ) 〈1+ ai,aj〉 = (2+ǫ) 〈ai,aj〉. Thus, if we choose ǫ > 0 sufficiently small, we
have that xi′ is revealed preferred to xj for all j 6= i, but not to xi. Furthermore,
〈pi′ ,xj′〉 = 3 − 〈ai,aj〉, which is minimized when i = j, so xi′ is not revealed
preferred to xj′ for all j 6= i.
Therefore, we have shown that our choice of pi’s and xj ’s is a valid RP
realization of (Sk,≻k) in R
3 for all k ≥ 3. Thus, we have demonstrated the
existence of partial orders with order dimension k but RP dimension 3, for all
k ≥ 3, hence concluding the proof of Theorem 3.
5 Further Work
This paper does not address the computational complexity of computing the RP
dimension of a given graph, and this is left as an open problem for future work.
Below is a summary of the computational complexity of matrix sign rank, and
what this implies for RP dimension.
Complexity of Matrix Sign Rank. Recall that the problem of computing
RP dimension is denoted RevPrefDim, and the problem of computing matrix
sign rank, MatSgnRnk. It is known [6] that MatSgnRnk in full generality
is complete for the existential theory of the reals: the problem of determining
whether a system of polynomial equalities and inequalities has a feasible solution
over the reals. This complexity class, often denoted “∃R”, is known to lie between
NP and PSPACE. In fact, it is ∃R-complete to determine whether a matrix has
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sign rank at most 3. However, this hardness result only holds when the sign
matrix is allowed to have arbitrarily many zero entries in each row and column.
When sign matrices are constrained to have no 0 entries, MatSgnRnk is known
only to be NP-hard. (Again, [6]). It is not known whether MatSgnRnk lies in
NP in this restricted setting, though we think this is unlikely.
This paper shows that the RevPrefDim problem is equivalent to computing
the sign rank of signed adjacency matrices, which are a (large) subclass of sign
matrices with exactly one zero in each row and column. Note that replacing a
row containing a single zero entry with two copies, replacing the zero with a
+ in one copy, and a − in the other, does not affect the sign rank. Therefore,
RevPrefDim is a special case of MatSgnRnk in the restricted setting, and
thus it cannot be a harder problem.
We leave as an open problem determining whether RevPrefDim is itself
NP-hard, and whether it is equivalent to MatSgnRnk on +,− matrices.
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